The Language of Democracy, Xenophobia, and the Rise of the Far Right in France and Spain After the 2015 Migration Crisis by Berkson, Jamie
Claremont Colleges 
Scholarship @ Claremont 
Scripps Senior Theses Scripps Student Scholarship 
2021 
The Language of Democracy, Xenophobia, and the Rise of the Far 
Right in France and Spain After the 2015 Migration Crisis 
Jamie Berkson 
Scripps College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses 
 Part of the French and Francophone Language and Literature Commons, Political Science Commons, 
and the Spanish and Portuguese Language and Literature Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Berkson, Jamie, "The Language of Democracy, Xenophobia, and the Rise of the Far Right in France and 
Spain After the 2015 Migration Crisis" (2021). Scripps Senior Theses. 1723. 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1723 
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at 
Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu. 
 1 
 
The Language of Democracy, Xenophobia, and the Rise of the Far Right 











Professor Marina Pérez de Mendiola 






Submitted to Scripps College in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of 














This thesis examines the relationship between immigration and far right-wing popularity 
in Europe, specifically France and Spain after the 2015 migration crisis. Comparing data from 
several European Union countries after 2015, a pattern is identified that when immigration 
increased, so did the representation of far right-wing parties. This thesis then details a nuanced 
analysis of two case studies, and the underlying reasons why far right-wing parties gained 
popularity in France and Spain. This thesis also examines the roots of present-day democracy in 
France and Spain, and how they contribute to current social understandings of national identity, 
which have led to increases in xenophobia in France and Spain which far right-wing parties have 
benefitted from.  To conclude, this thesis also offers insight into why this trend might be a 
warning of a larger European issue of a backlash against an increasingly multicultural Europe. 
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 In 2015, hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East began to make the 
onerous and perilous journey towards Europe in hopes of searching for safety and security for 
their families. The countries that were the most frequent point of entry from refugees during this 
crisis were the countries that border the Mediterranean Sea, meaning Greece, Italy, and Spain. 
These countries had an influx of refugees so large that the European Union felt it was necessary 
to establish a mandatory redistribution of the quantity of migrants throughout European Union 
member states. This redistribution effort, the Dublin Regulation, was created so that all member 
countries would be able to aid each other with this massive influx of people1. This mandatory 
call for accommodation was not well received throughout Europe, and some member countries, 
such as Hungary and Poland, countries under far right-wing leadership, outright refused to 
accommodate any number of refugees. 
There have been many consequences that followed the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, 
and a significant one has been a clear and common shift in voting and representation of far right-
wing parties from the member states of the European Union. Since 2015, many far right-wing 
parties within European Union member states have begun to gain more power and popularity 
from their electorates. For example, there is Alternative for Germany, the Law and Justice party 
in Poland, the Vox party in Spain, and the National Front party in France. This is just a short 
selection of the current number of right-wing parties that have gained a previously unheard of 
amount of popularity within Europe since 2015, but this list speaks to a larger problem within 
 
1
 “Asylum and Migration in the EU: Facts and Figures: News: European Parliament,” Asylum and migration in the 




Europe. These far right-wing parties contain one commonality: their campaigns are mobilizing 
on anti-immigrant sentiments of the citizens in their countries. 
This thesis will investigate the following questions: Is mass immigration a factor that has 
led to the recent considerable increase in popularity for and representation of far right-wing 
parties in France and in Spain? To what extent are these two phenomena linked? What does this 
link reveal about social understandings about citizenship and the pervasiveness of xenophobia in 
Europe as a whole? How could the foundations of Spain and France's democracies potentially 
influence the prevalence of these parties? In this thesis, I will argue that this trend in right-wing 
popularity has an inherent link to the 2015 migration crisis and Europe’s attitude towards 
immigration and foreigners and their reaction to European spaces becoming increasingly 
multicultural differently. The xenophobic rhetoric displayed by far right wing parties like Vox 
and the National Front in tandem with the push for restrictions on immigration through support 
of these parties reveal interesting and preoccupying foundational flaws in the language of the 
French and Spanish democracies. It also raises concerns over the social conceptualization of 
national identity and its intersection with democratic values. Though the Vox party and the 
National Front amassed a large increase in support during the aftermath of the migration crisis, 
the xenophobic sentiment within these countries are not new. They were further ignited and 
became less covert by the ostentatious politicization of increased immigration by far right-wing 
politicians in France and Spain.  
 
Methodology 
The methodology for this thesis will entail a two-step approach. The first step involves 
in-depth research and analysis the backgrounds of the specific political parties that will be 
 6 
discussed, as well as democratic foundations in France and Spain and their socio historical 
contexts. The second part of this thesis will compare and analyze the role of the migration crisis 
and what the electorate’s reactions to it reveal in France and Spain comparatively about 
discrimination, othering, and citizenship. Scholarly texts involving theories of nationhood, 
democratic ideology, and migration policy will guide and support the analysis of factors to 
explain the rise in far right-wing popularity.  
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Chapter 1:  Background to the Migration Crisis and the Effect on Europe 
 In order to demonstrate the link between immigration and far right-wing popularity, these 
variables must be tested to see if they have the predicted relationship. To visually test this theory, 
a table is conductive for comparative analysis. Using data from the Eurostat database’s 2018 
Migration and Migrant Population,2 I categorized the quantitative levels of immigration (actual 
numbers of immigrants)3 into three categories: high, moderate, and low. Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, Spain and Italy are listed by Eurostat as the countries with the most significant 
total numbers of immigrants, and all listing as having received between 340,000 to 917,000 
documented migrants. Other countries placed in the moderate category ranged from having 
approximately 111,000 to 189,000. The one country, Denmark, in the low immigration category 
was recorded to have around 68,800 migrants, and therefore quite lower comparatively to the rest 
of the countries, so it was labeled as low immigration. The countries I selected to be a part of this 
comparison are countries from western and central Europe, ones with similar histories post 
World War II and were not Soviet occupied territories (Germany is a small exception, but it is a 
special case). 
 The level of far right-wing increase in representation was categorized as significant, 
moderate, or low. Each title was designated in comparison to previous numbers of representation 
in the legislature of that country’s history. If a party more than doubled their presence, it is 
considered significant growth. If the far right only gained a few seats, or had seats but did not 
 
2 “Migration and Migrant Population Statistics,” Migration and migrant population statistics - Statistics Explained 
(Eurostat, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics. 
3 An alternative way of assessing this relationship could be to compare the percentage of far right-wing popularity 
increase to the ratio of immigrants to citizens in a particular nation.  
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increase in quantity, it was labeled moderate. If the representation in government did not change 
at all or decreased, it was labeled low.  
Country Level of Immigration Level of Far Right Wing Increase 
France High Significant 
Spain High Significant 
UK High Moderate4 
Germany High Significant 
Netherlands Moderate Low/Moderate 
Belgium Moderate Moderate 
Italy High Significant 
Greece Moderate Low 
Austria Moderate Moderate/Significant 
Denmark Low Very Low 
 
 Evidently, through the comparison presented in this table, there is a genuine relationship 
between the amount (numbers) of migration into the country and their increase in popularity and 
representation for the far right-wing parties. A trend clearly expressed through this chart is when 
the amount immigration was very high, there was also at the same time a traceable increase in far 
right-wing party representation.   
 
4 The United Kingdom is a special exception due to the circumstances of Brexit, there was already a very 
conservative center right-wing government in power, as well as a very strong anti-immigration movement in the 
United Kingdom. 
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France and the National Front (le Front National) 
 The National Front party, recently renamed as the National Rally, has gained popularity 
in recent years and has been featured quite frequently within the political media surrounding 
right-wing populist parties. This is not to make the claim that they are in power at the moment or 
will be in power in the near future - but to assert that their political following has noticeably 
grown in the past several years. This political party was founded in 1971 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
their main political interest being to curb immigration from Northern Africa. The National Front 
is now led by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. She led the charge to oust her father, and took his 
role in the National Front, and most recently ran for president of France in 2017. Jean-Marie Le 
Pen and his political views echoed those of the extreme right, abhorrently opposing immigration 
and European integration, and displaying hyper nationalistic agendas in government. Jean-Marie 
Le Pen also exhibited fascist tendencies in his political career through his ornery assault of 
Annette Peulvast Bergeal, a political opponent from the Socialist Party5, his numerous 
convictions of inciting racial and religious hatred, and through his sickening denial and 
minimization of the Holocaust.6 These tendencies and his rhetoric of lies and erasure of the 
Holocaust are what lead to his removal of leadership of the National Front, inciting a public feud 
between Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. 
When Marine Le Pen campaigned for the presidency of France in 2017, she caught the 
attention of many French citizens due to her provocative, nativist rhetoric about migrants and her 
unsavory ideals of what is to be considered as French. One of the main focuses of this political 
 
5
 “French Far-Right Leader Is Found Guilty of Assault,” Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles Times, April 3, 1998), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-apr-03-mn-35646-story.html. 
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party was the conservation of the traditional ‘French’ identity, and its defense against foreign and 
domestic enemies who wish to evolve it.7 This concept led into the party’s platform of a 
ferocious and provocative  anti-immigrant sentiment, in order to limit the notion of French 
nationality to fit certain individuals - and during the time of mass immigration into France and 
cities becoming rapidly more multicultural and from the Middle East- this became more popular 
than it had been in the past. Le Pen capitalized on the spike in immigrant fear that occurred after 
terrorist attacks, and she tried her hardest to awaken xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments 
or preserve the notion “la France aux français” or ‘France to the French’.8 She propagated this 
ideology at a rally towards the end of her presidential campaign, vowing to halt immigration and 
“rendre sa liberté à la France” or to ‘bring France it’s freedom’.9 10 
 Marine Le Pen had little success in the 2012 French Presidential election gaining 13.6% 
of the first round of voters and ceding to President François Hollande.11 This was slightly more 
preponderant than her father’s previous acquisition of votes, but the National Front still had a 
small presence within the French government. The migration crisis occurred during President 
Hollande’s presidential term, and public opinion and backlash over increased numbers of 
immigrants in France became a contentious and eagerly followed issue for debate during the 
following presidential election in 2017. Le Pen gained 21.7% of vote during the first round of 
 
7
 Jihan Abdalla, “Europe's Refugee Crisis: Right-Wing Populism and Mainstream Cooption in Germany and 
France,” CUNY Academic Works, 2017, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/731, 63. 




 Adam Nossiter, “Marine Le Pen Leads Far-Right Fight to Make France 'More French' (Published 2017),” The New 
York Times (The New York Times, April 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/world/europe/france-
election-marine-le-pen.html. 
10
 Laurent de Boissieu, “Marine Le Pen, " La France Et Les Français " D'abord,” La Croix, March 20, 2017, 
https://www.la-croix.com/Journal/Marine-Le-Pen-France-Francais-dabord-2017-03-19-1100833131. 
11
 Jihan Abdalla, “Europe's Refugee Crisis: Right-Wing Populism and Mainstream Cooption in Germany and 
France,” CUNY Academic Works, 2017, https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/731, 73. 
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elections, and in the second round she beat her Republican and Socialist opponents but lost to the 
centrist, Emmanuel Macron. She gained 33.9% of the vote in the second round, a previously 
unheard of level of support for a radical, far right-wing party like the National Front in France.12  
Spain and the Vox Party (El partido Vox) 
 The Vox party is a young, far right-wing party led by Spanish politician Santiago Abascal 
Conde. This party was formed in 2013, but it was purely a protest party for several years because 
of its inability to gain seats in the Spanish Parliament.13 The Vox party proposes radical ideology 
that would completely reconfigure the government in Spain, like eliminating autonomous 
communities that were created between 1979 and 1983 after Francisco Franco’s death. This 
running point and anti-immigration policies are the leading ideologies presented in the Vox 
party’s platform. Abascal centers his entire campaign and platform around provoking the highest 
degree of nationalism, propagating ideas of a unified Spain, which in turn, contributes to the 
erasure of the struggle of those seeking sovereignty and independence in autonomous 
communities like Catalonia and the Basque Country. 
Abascal presents his party's aversion to immigrants quite overtly, claiming he wants 
Spain to leave the Schengen zone, ending any kind of free movement of people, and he also calls 
for the deportation of all non-legally residing residents without any consideration of their 
particular circumstances. Their rhetoric is overtly xenophobic and anti-immigrant. For instance, 
Abascal, just days before the November 2019 election, disseminated false statistics that 
erroneously assigned blame on foreigners for the majority of sexual assaults in Spain, and the 
 
12 Gregor Aisch, Matthew Bloch, and K. K. Rebecca, “How France Voted,” The New York Times (The New York 
Times, May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/07/world/europe/france-election-results-
maps.html. 
13
 Manzanaro, Sanchez. “Vox: Who Are Spain's Far-Right Party and What Do They Stand for?” Euronews, 11 Nov. 
2019, www.euronews.com/2019/11/10/vox-who-are-spain-s-far-right-party-and-what-do-they-stand-for.  
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leader of the Vox party in Madrid, Rocío Monasterio, spoke of immigrant children as a threat to 
Spain’s neighborhoods’ safety.14 The leadership of Vox disguises and justifies their xenophobia 
and racism as ‘concern’ for those they see as ‘vulnerable’, like women and children; they have 
‘concern’ for these demographics - as long as they are Spanish-born. The Vox party tried to 
corral a sense of fear of foreigners and counted on the rise of this fear to gain votes. 
 The representation of the Vox party in Spain was unprecedented before the election in 
2018 where the Vox party gained 11% of the votes cast and 12 seats in regional government.15 
Soon following that in April of 2019, the Vox party gained comparatively significant 
representation in the congress of the Cortes Generales that before. They gained 24 seats in 
congress, and the following election in November of 2019, the number of seats increased to 52, 
more than doubling this party’s representation.16 
 A seemingly common denominator to the far right political parties in France and in Spain 
is their anti-immigrant rhetoric. Both the level of popularity and size of the platform for their 
agenda obtained by Marine Le Pen and the National Front in the 2017 election was not routine. 
This far right-wing party historically had never gained the active popularity in elections that they 
had until that election. The National Front historically ran on the same platform, the same 
xenophobic ideology, but the difference between the 2012 election and the 2017 election was the 
contextual social nuances in France created by current immigration situation caused by the 
refugee crisis in 2015. Spain is a migratory passage for immigrants because of its proximity to 
 
14
 Sam Jones, “Vox Party Puts 'Menace' of Migrant Children at Centre of Election Drive,” The Guardian (Guardian 
News and Media, November 10, 2019), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/10/vox-party-puts-menace-of-
migrant-children-at-centre-of-election-drive. 
15
 Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte, “Explaining the End of Spanish Exceptionalism and Electoral Support for Vox,” 
Research & Politics 6, no. 2 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168019851680, 1. 
16
 Guy Hedgecoe, “Spanish Elections: How the Far-Right Vox Party Found Its Footing,” BBC News (BBC, 
November 11, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46422036. 
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the sea, and North Africa. There was no representation of the extreme right in Spain’s congress 
until Vox, and it is necessary to view this alongside the timeline of this election. A tentative 
conclusion is that there is pattern between the level of immigration and the success of 
nationalistic right-wing populist parties, when the immigration increased, so did the popularity 
surrounding the xenophobia rhetoric presented by far right politicians. Marine Le Pen and the 
National Front shifted the political narrative in France farther to the right, as did Santiago 
Abascal in Spain.  In order to perhaps better understand how recent immigration patterns could 
have been the catalyst for the rise of far right political movements in both countries, it may also 
be useful to analyze more closely some of the foundational elements of the French and Spanish 





Chapter 2: Analytical Background 
In order to analytically assess the relationship between immigration, democracies, and far 
right-wing voting in this thesis, it is necessary to use guiding texts that detail the foundations and 
components of nations to better understand the function of national identity and by extension its 
relationship to voting. French historian Ernest Renan, in his lecture, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? 
(“What is a Nation?), published in 1882, theorizes what constitutes a nation and how people 
organize to form the construct of a nation. Renan defines a nation as a spiritual entity that is 
motivated to act through the will of free people who seek a collective identity.17 Renan makes 
several important assertions about what constitutes a nation and what does not. For what does not 
constitute the foundation of a nation, he addresses several falsehoods commonly associated with 
the definition of a nation. He asserts that, “Ethnographic considerations have therefore counted 
for nothing in the constitution of modern nations.”18 This is to assert that race nor ethnic origin 
are the foundations for belonging to or being a part of a nation. This undermines an inherent 
misconception about the presence of foreigners in a nation. Far right politician’s like Marine Le 
Pen misconstrue that the movement of refugees, specifically people from outside Europe, will 
diminish the French national identity. Le Pen markets Arab immigration, for example, as “une 
menace pour l’Occident” and specifically refers to France as targeted because of high levels of 
immigration.19 This is inherently false when considered in relation to the foundations of a nation. 
Renan takes this a step further and asserts:  
 
17 Ernest Renan, Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Nation? = What Is a Nation? (Tapir Press, 1996). 
18 Ernest Renan, Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Nation? = What Is a Nation? (Tapir Press, 1996). 8. 





“This exclusive interest in language as a criterion of nationhood has, like that of race, its 
dangers and inconveniences. When one exaggerates its importance, one limits and closes 
oneself up in a particular culture understood as national. One leaves the open air that one 
breathes in the midst of humanity in order to lock one’s self away in little freemasonries 
of one’s compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind nor more regrettable for 
civilization. We must not abandon this fundamental principle: that man is a reasonable 
and moral being before he is penned up in this or that language, a member of this or that 
race, or a participant in this or that culture.”20 
Renan asserts that language cannot act as the basis for unity, it is only a commonality between 
peoples, not an invitation for solidarity as conflict between linguistically similar groups exist. 
This is important to consider in the case of France, where there is a high emphasis placed on the 
importance of the French language, and much xenophobic rhetoric targets linguistic diversions 
from the French language. There is a fear of deviation from a norm because some French regard 
the presence of linguistic diversity as a threat to the French national identity, but this is false. A 
diverse concentration of languages does not threaten the integrity of a nation.  
 Renan identifies memories of suffering and struggle as integral to encouraging the unity 
of a nation. This concept is particularly interesting in the context of Spain with its history 
involving the Spanish Civil War and the Franco Regime. Many in Spain suffered during these 
events, a fact that should unify opinions and create a foundation for empathy of those fleeing 
civil war and internal strife of their home country. Instead, due to the lack of dismantlement of 
Franco’s legacies and institutions, and El pacto de olvido, a different sentiment has become 
fostered in Spain. Interestingly, the regions that have been historically suppressed and denied 
 
20 Ernest Renan, Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Nation? = What Is a Nation? (Tapir Press, 1996), 11. 
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independence from Spain, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, are the regions in Spain 
most welcoming to refugees and immigrants, nearly 17% of Catalonia’s population being 
foreign-born.2122 Through Renan’s writing it is possible to assert that many of the polarizing 
subjects and issues far right wing parties portray as threatened by immigration (language, 
religion, origin) are not what compound the identity of a nation. In understanding Renan’s logic 
of what elements do and do not form a nation, it can easily be deduced that migration does not 
threaten nationality, though many far right-wing political leaders want to pose it as one for their 
political gain.  
 Another fundamental text is the one by French philosopher and historian, Étienne 
Balibar, who in his article, Europe et réfugiés: l’élargissement, writes on the issue of migration 
and the European Union as a community, as well as the need for political change in Europe as a 
whole. Balibar’s text serves as a guiding theory on current immigration into Europe and the 
consequences of the current reaction to refugees. Through Balibar’s analysis of the limitations of 
the current democratic system in Europe, we can understand that this issue of xenophobia and the 
anti-immigrant platform is not just an issue within France and Spain, but a larger problem 
pertaining to questions of European identity. Balibar identifies the problems posed by the crisis 
and how a unilateral response was called for by Angela Merkel, but not entirely followed by 
European states. He critiques the disunity over the politics of migration, and distinguishes two 
Europes, differing in ideology for migration policies. Balibar defends the concept of a unilateral 
response to migration and critiques the nations who deviated from this kind of response, 
 
21 Sanjay Jeram, “Immigrants and the Basque Nation: Diversity as a New Marker of Identity,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 36, no. 11 (2013): pp. 1770-1788, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.664281. 




especially ones who actively minimize their obligations and close their borders. He calls this a 
politically organized “front transnational du refus des réfugiés et des migrants”.23  Balibar is 
calling for unity across Europe through the power of the European Union, and their democratic 
legitimacy to persuade Europe into conceptualizing a system that redefines European citizenship 
and also condemns violence against migrants.24  
 Both Renan and Balibar provide the framework for analysis of the migration crisis. 
Renan provides an outlook on the sentiments that symbolize and construct nationalisms, which 
are important when considering xenophobia and its relation to politics. Different 
conceptualizations of nationalism sway political affiliation, and parties that promote increased 
nationalism above all else, like the National Front or the Vox party, tend to be the ones that are 
strongly against immigration.25 In turn, Balibar provides a detailed trajectory of how these 
nationalisms will divide Europe. These nationalisms fueled by the presence of increased refugees 
and migrants will show the fragile bones of the cohesion of Europe. The lack of cohesion makes 
the situation in Europe more difficult and raises questions on what is European identity as a 
whole, as well as European citizenship. Another notion conceptualized by Balibar is the non-
typical system of borders in Europe and what this means for the infrastructure of democracy in 
Europe. Balibar argues that for Europe to become a place that is safe for refugees and migrants, 
who are fleeing to Europe due in part to past European or Western influence in the Middle East 
that has led to violent conflict, Europe form a unilateral initiative to accommodate refugees. To 
 








do so in Balibar’s eyes would mean creating a Europe of solidarity, without the divisions caused 
by nationalisms of member countries.26  
These two texts provide a nuanced understanding of how nationalism and the individual 
are related, and the necessity of dissolving the emphasis on nationalisms that divide Europe and 
make it democratically weakened in how they respond to the influx of refugees. The arguments 
and ideas presented by these two theorists will guide the analysis of certain aspects of how 
democracy functions in France and Spain. They will also provide a framework to delve into how 
the nature of French and Spanish democracies have allowed these nationalisms to be rooted into 
social exclusion of outsiders to their social conception of national identity, which subsequently 








Chapter 3: Democracy in France 
Brief History 
The democracy of France has gone through numerous transformations throughout its 
existence, and the history of revolution and regime change is important to understand its 
foundations. The French esteem their democracy quite highly, and many French hold the 
particular values of French democracy integral to their identity. France’s original democracy, the 
First French Republic, famously derived from the overthrow of the King and the Constitutional 
Monarchy and the storming of the Bastille during the French Revolution in 1792. Between then 
and current day, France has endured numerous regime changes, and the French’s notion of their 
democracy has become nuanced through change. The regimes included a Directory, a Consulate, 
two Empires run by dictators, several restorations, a second monarchy, and four more Republics, 
ending in the Cinquième République (Fifth French Republic) which is now France’s current 
republican form of government. It was created by Charles De Gaulle because of the collapse of 
the Fourth Republic. 27 
Under the regime of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), France still operated as a colonial 
power and had colonies abroad in Africa and Asia. It is important to note that France, a country 
that promotes strong belief in its “républicain” values and esteems its democracy very highly, 
still held onto some of its ex-colonies by turning them into four Départements d’outre mer. In 
the context of analyzing the foundations and strengths of France’s democracy, France’s 
preservation of its status as a colonial power until most of the 20th century is quite contradictory 
to the proclaimed values of its democracy. The fall of the Fourth Republic was triggered by the 
 
27 “French Governments Timeline,” Preceden, accessed December 9, 2020, 
https://www.preceden.com/timelines/243116-french-governments-timeline. 
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unrest during the start of decolonization in France’s colonies and the Algerian War. The Algiers 
Crisis of 1958 led to significant political turmoil in France over the status of Algeria as a colony. 
Charles de Gaulle instilled a new Constitution after a near coup, and the Fourth Republic became 
the Fifth. Under his constitution, the President of France was given a very strong position and led 
the National Assembly, and the Parliament was given weaker powers. This in itself is potentially 
a recipe for disaster because it causes an imbalance of power of democratic institutions - the 
President has more weight than the representative parliament. 
La Cinquième République derived from exclusionary and xenophobic ideals. These ideals 
are subtle undertones in De Gaulle’s Constitution. In article 1 of the French Constitution it reads, 
“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the 
equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion.” This is to 
create a notion of equality under the law, which would exclude any acknowledgement of a 
person's background in an attempt at universality. This concept of universalism has been rooted 
into French citizenship for centuries, dating back to the enlightenment - and it is dangerous for 
those who do not fit the mold of what is considered typically ‘French’ or do not wish to 
assimilate into a homogenized form of ‘Frenchness’. This as an element of the French 
Constitution shows the Republic’s exclusionary roots. “This was based on an understanding of a 
people or nation as socio-culturally homogenous”.28 France as a nation is not, and should not 
have to be, socially homogeneous. This practice of treating all people living in France 
‘universally’ functions as a tool that suppresses any deviation from the ‘French norm’ and is a 
tool that forces assimilation. For example, the notion of French secularism, or laïcité, does not 
have an even application on all demographics in France, a point that is developed in the second 
 
28 Jeremie Gilbert and David Keane, “Equality versus Fraternity? Rethinking France and Its Minorities,” OUP 
Academic (Oxford University Press, January 20, 2017), https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/14/4/883/2927935, 4. 
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part of this chapter. Not all from differing backgrounds are treated the same under these ideals, 
and universalism creates an unhealthy and oppressive phenomenon of ‘othering’ in France, 
permitted by the words of the Constitution, when one does not follow a specific set of beliefs for 
what a ‘French’ citizen should look like. The constraints of what makes a ‘French’ citizen are 
what xenophobic, Islamophobic, and anti-immigrant politicians like Marine Le Pen have 
capitalized on. In her platform through the National Front, she tries to frame the narrative on 
refugees through the lens of citizenship, before presenting refugees as people in need of 
solidarity and refuge.  
The new French Constitution continued to preserve some of the notions of the original 
French Republic, ones that came out of the French Revolution as a tool to reinforce the practice 
of universalism. One of the most known phrases embedded in the French Republic is the phrase 
“liberté, égalité, fraternité” - liberty, equality, and fraternity. In the preamble of the Constitution 
there is also reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, a writing that 
was created during the French Revolution. This declaration defines liberty as follows:  
“La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui: ainsi, l'exercice des 
droits naturels de chaque homme n'a de bornes que celles qui assurent aux autres 
membres de la société la jouissance de ces mêmes droits. Ces bornes ne peuvent être 
déterminées que par la loi”.29  
To summarize in English, this article states that “freedom consists in being able to do all that 
does not harm others” and that using natural rights shouldn’t be limited other than to assure that 
others in society receive the same chance to enjoy those rights. The definition presented in this 
 





article can be twisted and limited by the notions of universalism and the emphasis of assimilation 
in France. That is to say, to be accepted in society in France is to assimilate, but if you don’t 
assimilate or you are not recognized as a part of French society, you do not maintain the same 
level of freedom or basic rights. The embodiment of “liberté, égalité, fraternité” as the 
foundations for French values are not present in what France’s current socio-political climate 
demonstrates with the popularity of extreme right-wing parties like the National Front. The 
National Front’s “preservation” of French identity by rejecting immigrants and refugees is an 
appalling deviation from the definition given in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen. There is no liberty, equality or fraternity in refusing to accommodate persecuted people, 
because of their background and social differences. Here we see the true danger that is permitted 
by the language of the Republic - an intolerance for difference in ideology. The way the 
Constitution was written, framed, and understood provides a ground for manipulation from far 
right-wing parties to use language of the Republic to advance their xenophobic agenda. 
Democracy and Immigration.  The Case of Laïcité and Universalism. 
In 2015, at the beginning of the migration crisis, France received a large number of 
migrants and refugees, many being from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to internal conflict and 
war in their respective regions. The arrival and presence of these refugees has since been 
stigmatized and ‘othered’ by a portion of the French population, and politicians like Marine Le 
Pen have worked to further outcast this demographic of refugees as a threat to the ‘frenchness’ of 
France. The methodology and justification from the political right for this stigmatization and 
labeling of refugees as ‘unfrench’ is intimately linked to one of the foundational parts of the 
French Republic: laïcité, or French secularism.  
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In France, laïcité serves as a tool to separate religion from the public sector of France but 
does not limit its expression in private. This notion of secularism has been present in France 
since the Revolution and was written into law, from the Jules Ferry laws on secular education to 
the loi du 9 Décembre 1905, concerning the separation of the church and state. The laws of 
French secularism call for no religious influence in government affairs or public procedure. This 
applies to the domain of all republican institutions, most contentiously, in public schools and 
publicly funded institutions such as townhalls for example. The language surrounding religious 
expression is vague and underdefined. The law calls for the removal of “ostentatious” religious 
signifiers. But it is difficult to define what is “ostentatious,” and this is subject to the 
government’s interpretation. The hijab or headscarf, a normal and typical religious article of 
clothing that many Muslim choose to wear, is defined as “ostentatious”. President Jacques 
Chirac banned the wearing of hijabs in schools and labeled it as an “aggressive symbol” that 
France could no longer accept.  What is a normal and accepted religious signifier in many 
countries around the world, worn out of personal choice of religious expression, is seen as a sign 
of “religious proselytism,” or as a means to try to convert the French to Islam.30 This here helps 
demonstrate the Islamophobia that is ingrained in the French republic: the options for Muslim 
women are to either assimilate by taking off their veil, compromising their religious beliefs, or 
be punished by the Republic. There is such an intense fear of culture change with the influx of 
each immigration wave, particularly coming from North Africa and certain Middle Eastern 
countries, that France is attempting to censor any visible deviation from their Western comfort 
zone. 
 
30 “France Bans the Veil in Public Schools,” Facing History and Ourselves, accessed December 8, 2020, 
https://www.facinghistory.org/civic-dilemmas/france-bans-veil-public-schools. 
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The French concept of national identity is shaped through institutions and France’s 
school system works to enforce “the cultural assimilation and political integration” of students 
living in France.31 Recently, in October 2020, there was a horrific incident in Paris where a 
history teacher, who showed political cartoons about the Prophet Muhmmad, was killed by an 
immigrant teenager who was offended by the cartoon. This event reawakened the debates over 
secularism and schooling in France, and many communities, notably Muslim communities from 
around the world, are calling for a change in schooling procedure in France, which many in 
France are against. It also built on existing sentiments of Islamophobia from previous acts of 
terrorism in France, like the Charlie Hebdo massacre and the 2015 attack in Paris at the Bataclan. 
In response to this event, French President Emmanuel Macron revealed measures that will be put 
forth to combat “radical Islamism” and “Islamic Separatism”.32 He began a crackdown on those 
showing “signals” potential for radicalization by conducting raids and threatening deportation, as 
well as he announced his plan to “reform Islam” into a French Islam “of the Enlightenment” 
which he hope will “halt repeated deviations from the values of the republic”.33 Macron wants to 
increase the daily presence of the Republic and its associated value on the individual, clearly 
targeting the Muslim individual. Schools receiving public subsidies must pledge allegiance to the 
Republic through a contract with the state, and education through public institution is obligatory, 
if not attending a private institution. Instead of addressing issues of systemic racism or creating a 
 
31
 Norimitsu Onishi and Constant Méheut, “A Teacher, His Killer and the Failure of French Integration,” The New 
York Times (The New York Times, October 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/26/world/europe/france-
beheading-teacher.html. 
32 Hadrien Mathoux, “Loi Sur Le Séparatisme Islamiste : Macron Appelle à Un ‘Réveil Républicain’ Et Rend 
L'instruction à L'école Obligatoire,” Marianne, October 7, 2020, https://www.marianne.net/politique/macron/loi-sur-
le-separatisme-islamiste-macron-appelle-a-un-reveil-republicain-et-rend-linstruction-a-lecole-obligatoire. 
33 James McAuley, “Perspective | Instead of Fighting Systemic Racism, France Wants to 'Reform Islam',” The 
Washington Post (WP Company, October 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/macron-france-
reform-islam-paty/2020/10/23/f1a0232c-148b-11eb-bc10-40b25382f1be_story.html. 
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plan to alleviate the cyclical nature of poverty within immigrant dominated suburbs, Macron 
wants to fight further acts of violence by further increasing the presence of “republican values” 
in the public sector. His strict response to this incident has created international tensions between 
France and countries with large Muslim populations, most notably Turkey. Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, the President of Turkey, raised concerns against Macron’s response over his defense of 
the cartoon, and France’s rhetoric pertaining to Islam.34 It should also be noted that Macron’s 
response to this incident received praise from Marine Le Pen, claiming he finally accepted “her 
‘common sense’ view of ‘Islamism’ as the implacable enemy”.35  
This issue can be traced back to the root of how secularism is practiced and understood in 
France, and its effects on the Muslim population, the population in France most targeted by the 
contradictions of laïcité. While the tragic Charlie Hebdo massacre made it impossible for many 
people living in France and citizens to examine the potential root of the problem leading to this 
act beyond the issue of freedom of expression and that of terrorism, this recent event has made 
many French people rethink the constant use in schools of cartoons that portray or characterize a 
religion in offensive to certain members of its society. The argument that the separation of 
religious expression from schools and that secularism is applied universally is idealistic, but it 
does not reflect the actions and reactions of present-day France.  
The French notion of secularism is meant to fall under the républicain concept of 
universalism, but it affects certain religious demographics disproportionately and it has become 
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the basis for the French to try to force a problematic type of assimilation of those who practice 
Islam. French secularism targets Muslim women, some of who choose to express their faith by 
wearing a hijab - which is sometimes integral to their religious practice, in a way that it does not 
target people who practice France’s dominant religion, Catholicism. The notion that secularism 
serves as a principle of universalism, so that ‘everyone is equal with the distinction of the law’ is 
fraught because laïcité works to establish a lack of acceptance of the expression of individual 
religion outside of Christianity. It shows a lack of tolerance for difference and particularity, so as 
to be French, you must not be expressing your religion in a way that might distract from the 
‘Frenchness’ of France. This ‘universalism’ is constrained to France’s understanding and 
definition of what is ‘normal’ or what the standard for universal should mean. This is capitalized 
on by the National Front and Marine Le Pen as a way to mark generations of immigrants from 
the Middle East and Northern Africa, many of whom practice Islam, as outsiders and detriments 
to the notions of France and its core values. It is important to note that although the 2015 
immigration is not limited to those regions, it is the narrative that is often encompassed by the far 
right that way as well as in terms of a threat to secularism and French ‘values’.    
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Chapter 4: Democracy in Spain 
Brief History 
The current democracy established in Spain is relatively recent and its structure emerged 
during a period of great civil, political, and social upheaval in Spain. The circumstances that lead 
to Spain’s transition into a Constitutional Monarchy are important to reference when speaking of 
Spanish democratic values. Spain’s democracy emerged during the fall of the authoritarian 
regime of Francisco Franco, the long-time dictator that controlled Spain for 39 years. Franco rose 
to power at the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 after overthrowing the democratically 
elected Republic, imposing his nationalist party as the governing head of his fascist regime. With 
the memory of the collectively traumatic civil war in the minds of Spanish residents, Franco 
capitalized on their fear of a second civil war to solidify his power, and this same fear became a 
legacy tactic that disrupted the transition into democracy.36 Under Franco there was 
authoritarianism; he silenced any political opponent, outlawed opposing political parties and 
tried to repress any opposition through the Guardia Civil, a military force that policed with 
violence. He heavily suppressed any form of resistance to his regime, most horrifically in the 
Basque country and in Catalonia. Before his death he reinstated the monarchy and named his 
successor, Juan Carlos I. The fact that the democracy in Spain is founded on the dying dictator 
naming a “successor” that imposed a Monarchy, although the democratic government he 
overthrew was a republic, makes it easier to understand why many in Spain denounce the shaky 
foundations of this democracy. Political parties in the Basque Country, for example, refused to 
recognize and ratify the constitution as a result.  
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The Autonomous communities in Spain were created so as to not give certain regions in 
Spain the possibility to vote in a referendum for their sovereignty and independence from Spain. 
After denying regions the vote for the right to self-determination, the constitution pressured the 
newly formed Autonomous communities to conform to this post-Franco democracy for the sake 
of peace and stability. Minimal rights were devolved to Autonomous Communities but the most 
important political and economic factors (social security, foreign policy and macroeconomics) 
were reserved for the central government in Madrid. These are placating tactics, and they further 
the gap of opportunity for regions seeking real autonomy and in some cases statehood. The 
desire for “indivisible” or unified Spain is harmful to large portions of its populous and erases 
the struggle of regions wishing more control within their autonomy, or who request the right to 
decide through a democratic regional vote whether to remain as part of Spain or to regain its 
independence.  It is important to remember that many people in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia consider themselves as colonies of Spain and France.  
While there are a plethora of unresolved issues concerning the structure of governance 
and democracy in Spain, one of the most alarming, but telling, factors about emergence of 
democracy in post-dictatorship Spain is the fact that the current Spanish Constitution was 
partially drafted by a former member of Francisco Franco’s regime, Manuel Fraga.  Fraga served 
several roles throughout his time in power in Franco’s Cabinet, most notably as Propaganda 
Minister, as well as was an accomplice to the many horrific crimes committed under Franco’s 
dictatorial reign during the Spanish Civil war. Fraga is listed as “partícipe y cómplice de toda la 
política represiva que se aprobaba en el Consejo de Ministros: fusilamientos, cárceles, campos 
de concentración, despidos, exilio, Tribunal de Orden Público graves violaciones de los 
derechos humanos, expedientes a periodistas, cierre de medios de comunicación y asesinatos de 
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trabajadores".37 In English, this testimony lists Fraga as a participant in political repression 
through his work on the Council of ministers during Franco’s regime. He is listed as involved 
with mass imprisonment, assassinations, surveillance and censorship of media, and serious 
human rights violations. The notion that a prominent member of the previous Fascist government 
in Spain was attempting to help write its constitution is a threat in itself. The Spanish 
Constitution was drafted quite quickly after Franco’s downfall and Franco’s regime was never 
truly abolished during this transition into democracy. “Fraga believed that Francoism should 
evolve by building a democratic system capable of recognizing the moderate opposition 
sectors''.38 Fraga’s presence within the writing of the Spanish Constitution works to preserve 
Francoist legacies - ones that are inherently undemocratic. 
The governmental structure in Spain is constrained by the lingering memory and legacies 
from Franco’s regime. “Tampoco se depuraron las principales instituciones administrativas del 
régimen, ni se hicieron gestos de condena a la dictadura, ni de reconocimiento público a las 
víctimas del franquismo”.39 There was no dissolution of Franco’s governmental institutions, and 
no dismantlement of his dictatorial legacies. Spain’s government refused to acknowledge the 
terrors that occurred under Franco in their shift to democracy, which is a fundamental flaw to its 
foundation. A country cannot collectively move past a fascist dictatorship without taking a 
unified stance against it and critically recognizing the harm and damage done by the regime. 
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Anything other than this will work to preserve a legacy that does not merit conservation or 
reverie, and in the words of one Spanish citizen, "no se es demócrata sin ser antifranquista".40 
A piece of legislation that works to preserve Francoist legacies is El pacto de olvido, a far 
right-wing tactic which announced the intentional avoidance of direct confrontation of the 
horrors that occurred under Franco. In short, Spain was to “forget” about its fascism, agree to put 
the past behind them, and transition to democracy. But years of oppression and terror cannot be 
forgotten so quickly; this narrative is entirely reductive to those oppressed under Franco, and and 
is a barrier for justice and the recognition of undeniable truths surrounding the crimes of Franco 
and his regime. El pacto de olvido could not act as a catalyst for a strong democracy when it 
contributed to an erasure of history. In contrast, the left in Spain advocated for the memoria 
necesaria41, the necessary memory of this era, which would recognize the struggle against 
dictatorship.  
This avoidance and “olvido” of the legacies and memories of dictatorship, are a unstable 
foundation for democracy, and shows a lack of emphasis on accountability of historic and 
systemic violations of persecuted and oppressed people, like those in the Basque Country or 
Catalonia. If the Spanish government is willing to “forget” these injustices, ones committed 
against populations they claim as their own, as “Spanish”, how easily could they permit or 
excuse the maltreatment and discrimination against foreign people, specifically refugees from the 
Middle East? The circumstances in which the Spanish Constitution was written and the content it 
contains gives the perfect window of opportunity for far right-wing parties to become popular. It 
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gives an excuse for xenophobia, by allowing political parties like Vox to single out immigration 
as a threat to Spanish nationality.  
Democracy and Immigration: The Case of Indivisibility. 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 calls Spain the “indivisible homeland of all Spaniards” 
and the preamble states that Spain will “proteger a todos los españoles y pueblos de España en 
el ejercicio de los derechos humanos, sus culturas y tradiciones, lenguas e instituciones”.42 In 
English, Spain will protect its people and their human rights, culture, traditions, languages, and 
institutions. These qualities and promises are the ones that the Spanish government markets as 
foundations and goals for their democracy but are ones that are not upheld or represent the true 
nature of Spanish democracy; the actions of the government are what reveal its true nature. 
Spain’s systematic and repetitive suppression and forced integration of autonomous regions like 
Catalonia and the Basque Country as cases in point. These regions of Spain have repeatedly 
struggled and resisted for their independence from Spain before, during, and after the Franco 
dictatorship, but have been historically restricted and denied the right to decide their future by 
the Spain government under this idea of “indivisibility” of the Spanish country. In this matter, 
the Constitution does not act as it says it shall, not when these regions and their culture and their 
agency to self-determine and self-govern are suppressed by Spain in order to enforce an ideal of 
a unified nation. Renan describes the composition of a nation as “a daily referendum”, and in 
describing nationhood that way he asserts that nations are constantly evolving and changing.43 
Returning to the concept of indivisibility, it’s clear that the suppression of successionist 
movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia disregards the concept of continued consent of 
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nationhood. This reveals much about the nature and foundations of the Spanish democracy and 
how the Spanish government still views its nationhood and identity as static and unchanging. 
There is no listening to the will of the people within these regions on how they wish to define 
their nationhood or national identity.  
When the Spanish government does not listen to the will of people they claim as their 
own citizens, this puts into questions how they may characterize immigration and anything they 
see as a further threat to Spanish “indivisibility”. This leaves room for the Vox party to formulate 
their rhetoric on immigration as a threat to Spanish unity and national identity. The Vox Party’s 
platform and ideology works to further build on these barriers and suppression of autonomous 
communities. They are anti-immigrant and anti-separatism, purporting the notion that Spain is 
indivisible and should “abolish all home rule”.44 Alongside their anti-successionist rhetoric is 
their anti-immigrant rhetoric, which aims to make Spain a country that is unwelcoming to 
foreigners, or outsiders to their indivisibility. 
There is no ambiguity within the rhetoric of the Vox party, as Abascal champions the 
slogan “¡Españoles primeros!” (“Spaniards first!”) in his position, this slogan having been 
historically used and contextualized by nativist and nationalist parties in Spain like Democracia 
Nacional.45 He clearly is attempting to further the divide between his constituents, and migrants, 
by falsely portraying migrants as threats to the Spanish quality of life. Recently, Vox’s 
spokesperson in Congress, Iván Espinosa de los Monteros, asserted that illegal immigrants will 
receive a large sum from social security benefits according to a law recently passed by the 
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Spanish government, a statement that was denied by the Minister of Social Security and 
Migration on the basis that immigrants with irregular status’ cannot logistically even receive any 
social security benefits.46 Espinosa followed his statement with a disturbing message dictated 
three times in three different languages for maximal dissemination, so his message could reach 
the highest quantity of people. He said, “El mensaje tiene que ser muy claro para todos los 
inmigrantes que están pensando llegar a España. No vengan”.47 In English, “The message needs 
to be very clear for all immigrants thinking of arriving in Spain. Don’t come. We cannot 
welcome you.” Later he refers to migrants “dangerous journeys”48, a discourse clearly indicating 
that they are referring to migrants coming from outside of Europe, like those from the Middle 
East during the migration crisis. Vox wants to send a clear message to potential migrants to 
Spain saying that they will not be accepted there, and it is an even more threatening message to 
immigrants within Spain by implying that they should not feel secure or wanted there. 
Vox creates an “‘us versus them’ dichotomy, which characterizes populist discourse, [and 
it] is not only used against immigrants but it is mainly framed as a reaction of the ‘Spanish 
people’, supporting a unitary, homogeneous state, against forces of federalism and independence 
accused of undermining the integrity of the nation”.49 To Vox, Spain’s integrity lies in its unity 
and a precise notion of what it means to be Spanish; they wish to maintain a static and 
unchanging identity of Spanishness by excluding immigrants. To justify this closeminded notion, 
they call upon the language of “indivisibilidad” in the Spanish Constitution and have constructed 
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and encouraged a nativist and discriminatory narrative in the minds of their electorate. Vox 
actively encourages Spaniards to see themselves as superior to migrants because of their heritage 
as Spaniards and “put themselves first”. Vox’s presentation of the ‘us vs. them’ ideology works 




Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
Many speak of the 2015 migration crisis as the factor that is to be attributed for a rise in 
popularity for far right-wing political parties and a wave of xenophobia in Europe, but I would 
nuance this argument. In France and Spain, the sentiment against foreigners was already present, 
subtly ingrained in the language of their democracies. The massive movement of people became 
the catalyst that allowed these politicians to become more overt about their disdain for migrants 
from outside of Europe, using their platforms to publicly create a sense of fear of migrants and to 
encourage adoption of intensely nationalistic sentiments.  
 It is important to view the issue of rising nationalism and xenophobia not just as a result 
of immigration. Given the elections results, it is easy to assert the connection that after the 
migration crisis, there began a rise in far right-wing popularity in France and in Spain, or even in 
Europe as a whole. But it would be erroneous to consider the influx of immigration as the only 
catalyst for this obvious shift in public support of these far right-wing parties with xenophobic 
rhetoric. The narratives of the National Front and Vox do present immigrants and refugees as 
problems causing the rise in popularity of these parties. Even if these immigrants cannot be 
blamed for the erosion of Frenchness or Spanishness, their presence is a convenient excuse for a 
platform onto which these parties can easily continue to build their already present xenophobic 
agendas. The wave of increased support for the far right calls for a more nuanced analysis for 
what allows the spiteful rhetoric disseminated by the National Front and Vox.  It can be argued 
that in both cases, France’s and Spain’s, the issue lies in the potentially faulty foundation of their 
democracies and in how the democratic principles have become conceptualized into harmful 
notions of sociopolitical identity. 
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 The way that France and Spain’s democracies formed were drastically different, one 
emerging from a revolution and developing through many regime changes, and the other 
developed out of the end of a rather recent dictatorship. Despite their geographic proximity, the 
two countries have had drastically different political histories after World War II, but they are 
now mirroring each other in a way. Both countries are experiencing political shifts towards the 
far right, framing their ideological and political platforms around those they paint as threats to 
national identity, that is to say the refugees and immigrants from outside of Europe. The nature 
of the language of both French and Spanish democracies allow these parties to construct a 
narrative on non-European refugees and migrants as presences that will harm the fundamental 
components of their democracies. For France, it’s the presence of religious diversity and the 
conservation of uneven secularism as well as cultural sentiments derived from their nuanced 
history that becomes their justification. For Spain, the concept of indivisibility becomes their 
basis for strict preservation of a specific national image. Though, both nations emerged from 
drastically different histories and circumstances, they have begun to exhibit similar trajectories in 
their sway towards the far right. This presents an image that can possibly be reflective not just of 
France and Spain but of a shift in Europe as a whole, much like Balibar warns against.  
Alongside migration crisis, Europe has begun to go through a social reformation and 
change – and political change should follow. The European Union bases its ideals and 
foundations on ‘cooperation’ and ‘common standards and projects’, such as the Schengen area, 
therefore there must be actual embodiment of these ideals in their migration policy as well as a 
larger effort to make sure Europe as a whole is cohesively acting. It is a challenge the European 
Union must embrace as a whole because a fragmented approach has the potential to divide 
Europe as a whole- and elements of that are already present. It is, admittedly, more easily put 
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than done - but it is a must to prevent Europe from devolving into a continent divided by 
differing nationalisms. Far right-wing popularity is increasing and with it, Euroscepticism and 
xenophobia - threatening the stability of the community of Europe as well as the safety of 
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